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THE DUAL-CLASS SHARE STRUCTURE 
Olivia Wang∗ 
In September, 2014, Alibaba Group Holding Ltd. (hereinafter Alibaba), 
China’s dominant electronic commerce company, brought about one of the 
biggest initial public offerings (IPO) in the stock market.1 Alibaba’s IPO 
revealed that the company adopted a dual-class share structure.2 This dual-
class share structure first aroused the author’s concern when the author learned 
that the reason why Alibaba chose to go public in the United States was that 
the US stock exchanges allow companies going public adopt a share structure 
different than the normal “one share one vote” structure. In Part I of this Essay, 
the author gives a brief description of how the availability of the dual-class 
share structure in the US stock market became an attraction. Then in Part II the 
Essay goes on to discuss in more detail that why Alibaba (and some internet 
companies and high-tech companies, see below for more detail) insists on this 
structure. The author found that such structure contributes to innovations and 
seems to enable efficient decision-making process. In Part III, however, the 
author will show that the dual-class share structure is a double-edged sword. 
The structure would impede checks on managements, which makes the 
shareholders in a dual-class share company less protected. 
I. DUAL-CLASS SHARE STRUCTURES IS THE REASON WHY ALIBABA CHOSE 
TO GO PUBLIC IN THE UNITED STATES 
Dual-class share structure allow insiders to hold common stock with 
multiple votes per share, while the public holds common stock with only one 
vote per share.3 National Association of Securities Dealers Automatic 
 
 ∗ Managing Editor elect, Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability Review; J.D. Candidate, 
Emory University School of Law (2016). I would like to thank Joseph Tabler for his guidance during the early 
stages of this perspective, and Drew Case for his assistance during the drafting process that helped me develop 
this piece to its full potential. 
 1 Telis Demos, Rolfe Winkler and Matt Jarzemsky, Alibaba Targets $155 Billion Value in IPO, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/alibaba-to-set-ipo-price-range-at-60-66-a-share-
1409946492?KEYWORDS=alibaba.  
 2 See Alibaba Group Holding Ltd., Registration Statement (Form F-1) (May 6, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-
edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001577552&owner=include&count=40. 
 3 Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote 
Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 687 (1986). 
WANG GALLEYSFINAL 5/13/2015  2:27 PM 
64 EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW [Vol. 2 
Quotation System (NASDAQ) and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) both 
allow companies with the dual-class share structure to list on the securities 
exchanges.4 Not all stock exchanges allow this kind of deviation from the basic 
“one share one vote” shareholder structure. For example, Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (HKEx) in its listing rules clearly states: 
The share capital of a new applicant must not include shares of which 
the proposed voting power does not bear a reasonable relationship to 
the equity interest of such shares when fully paid (“B Shares”). The 
Exchange will not be prepared to list any new B Shares issued by a 
listed issuer nor to allow any new B Shares to be issued by a listed 
issuer (whether or not listing for such shares is to be sought on the 
Exchange or any other stock exchange) except: (1) in exceptional 
circumstances agreed with the Exchange. . .5 
So far, HKEx has denied the use of the “exceptional circumstances” exception 
by any applicants,6 including Alibaba.7 Alibaba has repeatedly confirmed its 
determination to keep the current shareholder structure.8 After receiving 
written confirmation from the NYSE that its dual-class share structure 
wouldn’t be an obstacle for a U.S. listing,9 Alibaba picked NYSE for its IPO.10 
II. DUAL-CLASS SHARE STRUCTURES HAS ITS ADVANTAGES 
Besides Alibaba, several internet companies, e.g. Google11, Facebook12, 
Groupon13, LinkedIn14, etc., went public with a dual-class share structure as 
 
 4 Id.  
 5 Hong Kong Stock Exchange Main Board Listing Rule 8.11. 
 6 David Graham, Chief Regulatory Officer and Head of Listing of HKEx, Weighted Voting Rights 
Concept Paper (Aug. 29, 2014), available at 
http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/hkexnews/2014/Documents/1408292news.pdf.  
 7 See Enda Curran, How Hong Kong Lost the Alibaba IPO, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2014), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303546204579440820673013810?mg=id-wsj (“Alibaba 
Group Holding Ltd.’s planned listing in New York is a blow to Hong Kong’s stock exchange, which failed in 
an effort to change its rules so as to accommodate what could be one of the world’s biggest initial public 
offerings.”). 
 8 Id.  
 9 Id.  
 10 Leslie Picker and Sam Mamudi, Alibaba Picks New York Stock Exchange for IPO, BLOOMBERG (June 
26, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-26/alibaba-picks-new-york-stock-exchange-as-venue-
for-largest-ipo.html.  
 11 See Google Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Apr. 29, 2004), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504073639/ds1.htm.  
 12 See Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Feb. 1, 2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000119312512034517/d287954ds1.htm.  
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well. Dual-class share structure is popular for a reason, and this Part II 
describes in both general and specific ways as to how this structure benefits 
internet or high-tech companies. 
For management in general, the benefit of dual-class share structure is 
obvious. With the superior voting rights in hand, although an IPO will reduce 
the management’s proportion of stock ownership, management has no concern 
with their control over the company being diluted.15 Non-controlling 
shareholders, in turn, are protected from conducting coercive takeover and 
from making mistakes with regard to the daily operation or management of the 
company.16 The latter argument is supported by the so-called “short-termism” 
concerns.17 Short-termism refers to companies taking actions that are profitable 
in the short term but do no good to the companies in the long term.18 A typical 
example of short-termism is that a company, under the pressure of activist 
investors, seeks to increase short-term earnings by cutting research that would 
be beneficial in the long run.19 Such long-term costs of short-termism are 
mainly produced by both shareholder interventions and management’s fears of 
such interventions.20 Therefore, shield boards from activist shareholders are 
desirable among managements, which hope to better serve the long-term 
interests of companies and their shareholders.21 Dual-class share structure is 
one way to meet this goal of board insulation. 
For internet or technology companies, dual-class share structure is highly 
valued because such structure contributes to innovations that would hardly 
generate short-term benefits, but would probably bring better future lives. In a 
letter to its shareholders, founders of Google stated: “outside pressures . . . 
often tempt companies to sacrifice long-term opportunities to meet quarterly 
 
 13 See Groupon, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (June 2, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1490281/000104746911005613/a2203913zs-1.htm.  
 14 See LinkedIn Corporation, Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Nov. 3, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1490281/000104746911005613/a2203913zs-1.htm.  
 15 Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 Va. L. Rev. 
807, 812 (1987). 
 16 Id. at 811. 
 17 Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 
1637, 1638 (2013). 
 18 Id. at 1638-39. 
 19 Id. at 1639. 
 20 Id.  
 21 Id.  
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market expectations.”22 With regard to Google’s insist on dual-class share 
structure, the letter explained that Google “designed a corporate structure that 
is will to protect Google’s ability to innovate.”23 Indeed, Google glass and 
Google driverless car are good examples of innovations without short-term 
benefits but with a view to future life. Such freedom in developing high 
technology attributes to some extent to Google’s shareholder structure. In 
contrast, Apple Inc. does not have a dual-class share structure, and it is likely 
that shareholder actions might bring Apple to a dilemma. A recent noteworthy 
case is that hedge fund manager David Einhorn urged Apple to start 
distributing to shareholders some of the large cash holdings it had 
accumulated.24 
As an electronic commerce giant with multiple services available, Alibaba 
is seeking both the expansion on its current services to other countries besides 
China, but also innovations that better serve the goal of development and 
cooperation in the future. For example, Alibaba opened an institution named 
“AliResearch” in April, 2007.25 This institution aims at building up a business 
knowledge sharing platform that provides business data analysis, and 
successful cases of mom-and pop shops or other types of small businesses.26 
One significant business data AliResearch provides is called “internet 
Shopping Price Index (iSPI)”, a product of AliResearch’s cooperation with 
scholars and the National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of 
China, which function is to indicate the general price level of goods or services 
trade in two of Alibaba’s flagship online retail platforms, Taobao and 
Tmall.com.27 In addition, AliResearch also put efforts into building up a digital 
library that covers data information from areas of trade, finance, map, life 
services, etc.28 Right now the library has 58 billion books collection, amount to 
100PB data information.29 These data enable online merchants to obtain the the 
big picture of their industry, the market profile of their brands, and consumer 
 
 22 See Larry Page & Sergey Brin, Letter from the Founders, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 29, 2004), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB108326432110097510.  
 23 Id.  
 24 See Einhorn’s Letter: Dear Fellow Apple Shareholder, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2013/02/07/einhorns-letter-dear-fellow-apple-shareholder/.  
 25 AliResearch, About Us (阿阿阿阿阿，关关关们), http://www.aliresearch.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 8, 
2014). 
 26 Id.  
 27 Id.  
 28 Tao Yajie, Alibaba Steps into Big Data (陶娅娅, 十十十十 阿阿十十十十十十十剑 ), SINA FINANCE (May 22, 
2014) http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20140522/012319184737.shtml.  
 29 Id.  
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behaviors relating to their online shopping.30 Building up a Big Data platform 
is both time-consuming and costly, however, once successful, it will bring 
major impact to the electronic commerce industry. Public investors are likely 
to disfavor a long-term project like AliResearch merely because its lack of 
short-term benefits. It is fair to conclude that Alibaba’s dual-class share 
structure makes the Big Data dream possible to come true. 
III. DANGERS IN DUAL-CLASS STRUCTURE 
Although dual-class share structure has its advantages, it seems to be 
disfavored by investors. In recent years Council of Institutional Investors (CII) 
expressed to NYSE and NASDAQ several times its request of going back to 
the principle of one share, one vote.31 In one of the letters CII specifically 
expressed that it was disappointed that NYSE allowed the listing of Alibaba 
after Alibaba was reportedly denied listing by HKEx.32 In the view of long-
term investors, some of the worthy goals, such as “enhancing the 
accountability of the listed companies”, and “allowing shareholders to more 
easily and efficiently monitor performance of directors”, are undermined by 
the listing of Alibaba with a dual-class share structure.33 In addition, some 
scholars also challenged the view that shareholder intervention with short-term 
orientation leads management to initiate and take actions that are profitable in 
the short term but detrimental in the long term. 34 In examining investor’s 
concerns with dual-class share structure, this Part proceeds in three stages. 
First, section A discusses what dangers the dual-class share structure may 
bring to the public investors. Second, section B examines the “short-termism” 
concerns and the challenges against such claim. 
A. Dual-class Share Structure Eliminates Market Checks on Managerial 
Misconduct 
Companies like Alibaba with their dual-class share structure are more 
likely to have concentration of power, which easily defeats checks on 
managerial misconduct. Pursuant to Alibaba’s articles of association, Alibaba 
 
 30 Id.  
 31 See, e.g., Letter from CII to NYSE on One Share, One Vote, (Mar. 27, 2014), available at 
http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2014/03_27_14_CII_letter_to_NYSE_one_shar
e_one_vote.pdf.  
 32 Id.  
 33 Id.  
 34 See Bebchuk, supra note 17, at 1658. 
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Partnership is the management, which currently comprises of 28 members—22 
members of the management and six members of the management of the 
related companies and affiliates.35 Alibaba Partnership has the exclusive right 
to nominate a simple majority of the board of directors of the company. In its 
registration statement Alibaba also stated that they expected to enter into a 
voting agreement pursuant to which both SoftBank (now owns 34.1% shares of 
Alibaba) and Yahoo (now owns 22.4% shares of Alibaba) will agree to vote 
their shares in favor of the Alibaba Partnership director nominees at each 
annual general shareholders meeting.36 This meant that, while Alibaba’s 
founder Jack Ma and the co-founder and vice chairman Joe Tsai collectively 
held 13.4% of total shares outstanding, they are able to hold the majority of 
shareholder’s total voting power.37 
In a public traded corporation in which each share has equal voting power, 
the corporate governance works in a way that shareholders elect the board of 
directors, which in turn perform the function of monitoring possible 
mismanagement or self-dealing by those in control of the corporation, and 
selects the officers who run the corporation.38 In contrast, in a company like 
Alibaba, dual-class share structure defeats the oversight function of the board, 
because the directors are impeded from exercising the fiduciary duties, fearing 
that they can be fired by a single person.39 
There is a precedent that could further corroborate the concern raised in this 
section. In 2011, Yahoo, one of the majority shareholder of Alibaba at that 
time, claimed that it was blindsided when Alibaba transferred ownership of 
Alipay, which is often treated as the Chinese counterpart of Paypal, to a new 
company owned by Alibaba CEO and founder, Jack Ma.40 Softbank, a Japan-
based company that also owns a major share of Alibaba, declared the same 
thing.41 On the other side, Mr. Ma said that the transfer was legal—due to the 
operation of the dual-class structure.42  No doubt that Yahoo and Softbank 
 
 35 Alibaba Registration Statement at 14.  
 36 Id.at 46  
 37 See id at 46.  
 38 Tian Wen, You Can’t Sell Your Firm and Own It Too: Disallowing Dual-class Stock Companies from 
Listing on the Securities Exchanges, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2014) (citing ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & 
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 4 (1933), at 86-87). 
 39 Id.  
 40 Amir Efrati, Yahoo, Alibaba Reach Alipay Agreement, WALL ST. J., June 1, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303745304576358002657500050. 
 41 Id.  
 42 Id.  
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were annoyed, but later the two majority shareholders reached an agreement 
with Alibaba to resolve their dispute over the ownership transfer of Alipay.43  
According to the agreement, Alipay stayed with Mr. Ma’s company, while Mr. 
Ma promised not to use Alipay to siphon off revenue of Taobao, a Chinese 
counterpart of Ebay or Amazon.44  As two of the biggest shareholders of 
Alibaba, Yahoo and Softbank had limited options in the face of the insider 
control. One could imagine the difficulties for most minority shareholders to 
protect themselves if this kind of blindsighting ever occurs again. 
In addition to the lack of traditional oversight by the board, the NYSE rules 
“help”  Alibaba Partnership to exercise their power even more freely by saying 
that companies with dual-class share structure that fall under the definition of a 
“controlled company” are not required to have independent directors on the 
board.45 At least in theory, independent directors ensure that corporate officers 
do not abuse their authority or shirk their responsibilities.46 Therefore, for 
those dual-class companies that are qualified as controlled companies, 
shareholders lack another safeguard against managements’ self-dealing or 
misconduct. 
It is worth attention that if a company with dual-class share structure results 
in insufficient board accountability, shareholders are not the only ones that 
suffer.47 Once the traditional monitoring function of boards does not work, it 
will be transferred to third parties, such as the courts and the government, and 
the public will be forced to bear the costs.48 
B. Dual-class Share Structure Is No Guarantee to Long-term Benefits 
The argument that dual-class share structure saves a company from meeting 
the needs of short-sighted individuals and would benefit the company in the 
long run needs a second thought. As mentioned in Part II, short-termism 
concerns are regularly invoked to explain corporate failures and crises.49 The 
 
 43 Id.  
 44 Id.  
 45 See NYSE Listed Company Manual, § 303A.00 (2014), available at 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM/, (“A listed company of which more than 50% of the voting power for the 
election of directors is held by an individual, a group or another company is not required to comply with the 
requirements of Sections 303A.01, 303A.04 or 303A.05.” Sections 303A.01, 303A.04 or 303A.05 are 
provisions that require listed companies to have certain amount of independent directors on the board.).  
 46 Wen, supra note 38, at 1500. 
 47 Id. at1499. 
 48 Id.  
 49 Bebchuk, supra note 17, at 1646-47. 
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popularity of this claim makes a good defense for the arrangements of board 
insulation such as a dual-class share structure.50 However, evidence supports 
the view that, instead of bringing out value-reducing actions in the long-term, 
shareholder’s intervening with companies provides long-term benefits to 
companies, shareholders, and the economy.51 
One source of evidence is an empirical study by Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and 
Lucian Bebchuk on the long-term effects of hedge fund activism.52 This study 
indicates that activist shareholders target companies whose operating 
performance lags behind peers, and these interventions are followed by 
consistent and long-term improvements in operating performance.53 The 
conclusion to this study is that, taking a long-term perspective, the market does 
not fail to appreciate the long-term consequences of activism as insulation 
advocates fear it does.54 Rather, the stock appreciation accompanying activists’ 
initial announcement reflects the market’s correct anticipation of the 
intervention’s effect, and the initial positive stock reactions is not reversed in 
the long term. 
Some other studies indicate that board insulation eliminates or substantially 
weakens insiders’ incentives to better serve shareholders.55 One study by 
Ronald Masulis, Cong Wang, and Fei Xie demonstrates that firms with 
classified boards are more likely to be associated with undesirable acquisition 
decisions—that is, acquisition announcements that the market determines is 
value-reducing.56 
In addition, there is evidence that dual-class share structure enables 
managers to increase their own benefits.57 A study by Kenneth Borokhovich, 
Kelly Brunarski, and Robert Parino found that managers of companies with 
stronger antitakeover defenses enjoy higher compensation levels.58 
 
 50 Id.  
 51 Id. at 1644. 
 52 Id.  
 53 Id.  
 54 Id.  
 55 Id. at 1679. 
 56 Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns, 62 J. FIN. 
1851, 1883 (2007). 
 57 Bebchuk, supra note 17, at 1680. 
 58 Kenneth A. Borokhovich, Kelly R. Brunarski & Robert Parrino, CEO Contracting and Antitakeover 
Amendments, 52 J. FIN. 1495 (1997). 
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In sum, the above mentioned studies clearly show that dual-class share 
structure has adverse effect on building a diligent and efficient board. On one 
hand, directors lack the incentive to better serve shareholders and the 
companies. On the other, the relative insulated structure prevent or delay the 
replacement of leaders once the leaders prove to be ill-suited for their 
positions.59 Because it is important for a company to be led by individuals who 
are well suited for their roles, the relative insulation of the board in a dual-class 
company represents significant costs in the long run.60 
One example is Reader’s Digest Association, which had a dual-class share 
structure and was controlled by two nonprofit philanthropic foundations 
created by its founders.61 The goals of the controlling persons, driven by a need 
to fund their own projects, were not aligned with those of the shareholders—
while investors generally want the board to determine what is in the best 
interest of all shareholders in order to create long-term value, the board ended 
up issuing dividends in excess of cash flows.62 
By examining the abovementioned studies and cases, this Part defeats the 
short-termism concerns as a justification of dual-class share structure. Once we 
see the potential risk for a dual-class company in the long run, dual-class share 
structure seems unnecessary. 
CONCLUSION 
Alibaba’s IPO brought attention to its dual-class share structure. Dual-class 
share structure enables companies, especially those that are high-tech or 
internet-driven, to bring innovations to the table. However, no matter what 
benefits dual-class share structure may bring, this structure has the nature of 
board insulation, which in turn impedes checks on management. Although the 
right to bring a class action lawsuit against insiders is available to the 
shareholders in a company with dual-class share structure. Whether this 
mechanism provides shareholders with sufficient protection remains to be 
seen. What’s more, the justification for the dual-class share structure—that 
short-term results pressures directors to focus excessively on these short-term 
results—is contested by several empirical studies that show that the dual-class 
 
 59 Bebchuk, supra note 17, at 1680. 
 60 Id. at 1681. 
 61 Wen, supra note 38, at 1499 (summarizing the comments of Michael S. Geltziler, Executive Vice 
President and CFO of NYSE). 
 62 Id.  
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share structure is no guarantee to long-term benefits. Given that any kinds of 
extra monitoring mechanism are unavailable currently under the legal system, 
NYSE and other stock exchange market need to seriously consider the 
appropriateness of keeping the soft rule of allowing dual-class share structure. 
 
